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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
evidence when as a whole it shows that the event or causa-
tion sought to be proved is more probable than not."1 8
Apparently the court correctly relied on the expert medical
testimony that causation was likely as the major proof of
causation. It is interesting to note the fine line separating the
areas of competence of the experts. In this case the chemical
experts could testify as to the qualities of the ingredient, but
were not competent to testify as to the ingredient's effect upon
human skin, a point at which a medical expert became the
paramount authority.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
"Earnings" and "Fruits"
Wurst v. Pruyn decided that the wife's earnings were not
"fruits of labor" within the meaning of article 2386 of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code and therefore that the wife's filing of a declara-
tion reserving to herself the administration of her paraphernalia
and all rights to its fruits, including those "from the result of
labor," had no effect on whether her earnings were separate or
community income. In Smith v. Smith,2 decided in 1960, the
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit had decided the same
issue in contrary fashion, but the Smith decision clearly was in
error. Article 2386 refers to "fruits of the paraphernal property
of the wife" only, but lists all three kinds of fruits, those "nat-
ural," "civil," and "from the result of labor," which latter phrase
is substantially the definition of "cultivated fruits" under article
545 of the Civil Code.
There are instances, however, in which it becomes more dif-
ficult to decide whether income consists of "earnings," "fruits,"
or capital gains. Perhaps the classic instance is that of Hellberg
v. Hyland, decided in 1929,3 in which the supreme court treated
as earnings the capital gains made by the wife through the ma-
nipulation of her paraphernal assets. Paxton v. Bramlette4 may
become equally celebrated. A wife placed paraphernal immov-
13. Id. at 628.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 233 So.2d 255 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
2. 117 So.2d 670 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
3. 168 La. 493, 122 So. 593 (1929).
4. 228 So.2d 161 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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ables in a corporation, which she managed, and filed the declara-
tion authorized by article 2386 of the Civil Code reserving to
herself the administration of her paraphernalia and its fruits.
The corporation's assets produced fruits, but instead of taking
them as dividends, which would have belonged to her as para-
phernalia because of the declaration, she paid them to herself in
the form of remuneration for her services as an officer of the
corporation. The court of appeal ruled the "salary" constituted
"earnings" rather than "fruits" and treated it as a community
asset under the construction given article 2334 of the Civil Code
by Houghton v. HaiL
No fault is to be found with this decision. On the contrary,
fault can be found with any provision of the law on the com-
munity of acquets and gains which treats the substantive inter-
ests of husband and wife differently under the same circum-
stances. All earnings of the husband and all fruits of his sepa-
rate assets fall into the community regardless of circumstances.
If this is good law, then so should all earnings of the wife and all
fruits of her assets fall into the community, regardless of cir-
cumstances.
Profit Sharing Plan Benefits
There can be no quarrel with the conclusion in Laffitte v.
Laffitte5 that those rights in a profit sharing plan earned by a
spouse during the existence of the regime fall into the commu-
nity. After reasoning to this conclusion, however, the court in
its judgment proper seemed to recognize the non-employee spouse
as entitled to half the amount credited to the account of the em-
ployee spouse both before and during marriage. If so, there was
error inconsistent with the reasoning of the court.
In addition, the judgment proper seems to have considered
the employee spouse accountable to the other immediately on
dissolution of the regime, even though he could not obtain pay-
ment of the amount due him under the plan unless and until his
employment terminated under circumstances which would not
work a forfeiture of its benefits. The employee spouse, moreover,
apparently had the right under the plan to designate a "bene-
ficiary" on death and thus the plan incorporated an "insurance"
feature. It is submitted that the non-employee spouse should
5. 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
6. 232 So.2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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have been treated as entitled to a one-half interest in so much of
the amount earned by the employee during the marriage, but
only as of the day on which he effectively received or disposed of
the funds under terms of the plan itself. The court seems to
have reasoned that on termination of the matrimonial regime
the non-employee spouse had an immediate right to a one-half
interest in so much of the fund as was earned during marriage
simply because the employee spouse could have claimed it by
terminating his employment at that time. The condition was one
based on the exercise of a faculty, but it was not potestative,
for its exercise might have resulted in serious detriment to him.
In the opinion of the writer, the employee spouse should not
have been made to account immediately for one half the fund.
Separate Funds in a Joint Account
One of the issues in Succession of Smith7 was whether the
wife, after death of the husband, could claim restitution of a
sum transferred during marriage from her separate account to
the spouses' joint account. The court refused to permit the wife
to obtain reimbursement, but apparently not because she had
failed to prove the funds had not been disbursed for her separate
benefit. The court reasoned that the wife was entitled to demand
return of her paraphernal funds only if they had been "aban-
doned" or "surrendered" to the control of her husband and that
in placing the funds in a joint account she had retained control
over them. The court must have confused the right of the wife
to a return of her paraphernalia in the hands of her husband
with the general right of anyone to claim what is his. The ques-
tion in Smith was of the latter kind. Besides, the wife in Smith
was seeking an accounting after her husband's death. Article
2391 of the Civil Code, which declares the wife may sue the hus-
band during marriage for the return of her paraphernalia, can
apply only during marriage and does no more than make it clear
that paraphernalia, unlike dowry, is always subject to control by
the wife if she wishes to exercise it.
The Smith decision contains other language which implies
a misunderstanding of the wife's rights as to her paraphernalia.
Thus the court stated that under Miller v. Handy,8 decided in
7. 232 So.2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
8. 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
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1881, the wife may recover her paraphernalia only if she has not
delivered it to her husband as her mandatary. This would be
strange law indeed. Not only is mandate always and essentially
revocable under article 3028 of the Louisiana Civil Code, but
Miller v. Handy addressed itself to the question of the return
of the fruits of the paraphernalia, not the paraphernal capital
itself. Moreover, it may be observed that Miller v. Handy, though
often followed, was itself erroneous; for it was based on previous
decisions founded on Digest of 1808, 3.5.59, deleted in the Civil
Code of 1825 and superceded therein by the contrary rule in-
serted into what is now article 2402, that all fruits of any assets
administered and enjoyed by the husband "either of right or in
fact" fall into the community. Since 1944, of course, whether the
fruits of the wife's paraphernalia enter the community depends
on whether she has reserved these to herself by filing a declara-
tion to that effect consistently with article 2386.
Partnership Interest Under the Community Regime
Dubuisson v. Moseley9 gives a ray of hope for a general ap-
proach to handling a spouse's interest in partnership capital. At
the time of his death the husband's share in a checking account
in the name of the partnership of which he was a member was
greater than his share thereof at the time of his marriage. The
court applied the principle of article 2408 of the Louisiana Civil
Code to rule that only the increase in value was a community
asset. In doing so the court rejected the argument that partner-
ship funds deposited to the same account during marriage were
partly "community funds" and that through commingling the
entire share of the husband in the partnership account at his
death was to be treated as a community asset. The court's rea-
soning was that the account was one of the partnership, in effect
an enterprise not to be identified with the husband himself, and
that it could not be said that any partnership funds as such en-
tered the community between husband and wife until they were
disbursed to the husband. The extension of this very reasonable
attitude would go far to eliminate many so-called "commin-
gling" situations with their frequent consequences of a spouse
being deprived of his or her separate capital. '
9. 232 So.2d 870 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
